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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

I

WOODHAVEN APARTMENTS ,
Plaintiff/Appelleef

5
:

VS.

J

BERTHA WASHINGTON

:j

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940233-CA
Priority No. 15

J

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Bertha Washington ("Washington") appeals the
decision of the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department,
State of Utah.

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(d).
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Is a liquidated damages clause unconscionable which

penalizes a residential tenant an arbitrary amount beyond the
rent actually due?
Because the unconscionability of an act or practice is a
question of law for the court pursuant to the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act, Utah Code §13-11-5(2), the court should review

under the "correctness" standard, affording the trial court's
conclusions of law no particular deference*

State v. Pena, 869

P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
2•

Is the Reid itemized method of calculating damages after

a lease is broken the exclusive remedy for a landlord?

Reid v.

Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).
Because the trial court's decision on this issue rests on
interpretation of a Supreme Court decision and applicable law,
the court should review under the "correctness" standard,
affording the trial court's conclusions of law no particular
deference.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are controlling in this action:
Utah Code §13-11-3
Utah Code §13-11-5
Utah Code §70A-2a-504
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Appellee Woodhaven Apartments ("Woodhaven") and Washington
entered into a lease agreement for a period commencing May 30,
1991, to May 15, 1992. [Tr. 7] Washington resided at Woodhaven
until Woodhaven's agent verbally informed Washington that her
lease would be terminated based upon too many people living in
2

the apartment.

[Tr. 52] Accordingly, Washington vacated the

apartment on October 31, 1991.

[Tr. 55] Woodhaven subsequently

rerented the apartment on November 15, 1991. [Tr. 26] Woodhaven
then charged Washington $705.30 when the lease was terminated.
[Tr. 46]

The total amount is broken down as follows: fifteen

days of rent until the apartment was rerented, the damages
incurred within the apartment and a $531.00 "relet fee" based
upon the lease.

[Tr. 45-6] Woodhaven brought suit against

Washington to collect the $705.30.
found for Woodhaven.

[Tr. 1] The trial court

Washington now appeals the trial court's

decision.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable William
A. Thorne on July 15, 1993, in the Third Circuit Court, West
Valley Department.

The Court heard testimony from numerous

witnesses, including the parties.

Following this testimony and

closing arguments from counsel, the Court entered its decision on
November 12, 1993 and the decision is the subject of this appeal.
C.

Statement of the Pacts

Woodhaven brought this action for damages pursuant to a
lease agreement between the parties after Washington vacated the
apartment prior to the end of the lease term.

[Tr. 7]

These

damages consisted of rent until the apartment was rerented,
3

claimed costs of damages and repairs, and a "termination fee" of
one and one-half months rent, pursuant to paragraph 26 of the
lease.

[Tr. 45-6]

Washington admitted she owed the rent until

rerented, denied she caused the damages and argued that the
liquidated damages clause was unconscionable pursuant to the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA), Utah Code §13-11-5.
[Tr. 63-7]

Woodhaven argued that this clause was commonly used

in lease agreements and was not unconscionable.

[Tr. 48-9]

The trial court found Woodhaven to be a supplier under the
UCSPA.

[R. 134]

The trial court found that Woodhaven had not

proven that any damages to the property were the responsibility
of Washington and found that the UCSPA applied to this
transaction but that the liquidated damages clause was not
unconscionable.

[R. 134-6]

Judgment was entered for the unpaid

rent, for the liquidated damages of $531.00, for court costs and
for attorney fees, less credit for a payment and for a deposit,
leaving a total judgment against Washington of $819.00.

[R. 139]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should reverse the lower court's decision because
the liquidated damages clause contained in Woodhaven's lease is
unconscionable.

The clause works as a penalty because it bears

no reasonable relationship to the actual damages sustained by
4

Woodhaven.

Therefore, this court should find that this

unconscionable clause is in violation of the UCSPA.
Moreover, this court should reverse the trial court's
decision regarding the measure of damages and follow the holding
of the Utah Supreme Court in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins, Co.,
776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

The court should hold that an

itemization of actual damages is the exclusive remedy for a
landlord in Utah.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WOODHAVEN'S LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE
VIOLATES THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT
The trial court found that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices
Act (UCSPA) applies to residential leases.

Specifically, the

trial court found that Woodhaven was a "supplier" as defined in
Utah Code Ann. §13-11-3(6).

[R. 134]

The trial court further

found that the leasing agreement was a "consumer transaction" as
defined in Utah Code Ann. §13-11-3(2).

[R. 135] The trial

court's finding is consistent with statements of Justices Durham
and Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d
1006 (Utah 1991).

Although the trial court correctly held that

the UCSPA applied to residential lease transactions, it ruled
incorrectly that the liquidated damages clause was not
5

unconscionable.
A.

Woodhaven's Liquidated Damages Clause is Void
Because It Works as a Penalty»

Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause, lease paragraph 26,
charges a flat one and one-half months rent for tenants who
vacate the premises prior to their lease expiration date.
[R. 11] Woodhaven's measure of charges, paragraph 26, is not
designed as a reasonable measure of anticipated damages but as a
penalty to the breaching party.

The Uniform Commercial Code

(UCC), codified in Utah at Utah Code §70A-2a-5G4, defines
liquidated damages as "an amount or . . . a formula that is
reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm caused by the
default or other act or omission."
1.

Utah Code §70A-2a-504(1)

Woodhaven's clause was not in a reasonably
anticipated amount.

Following the UCC, Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause is
a penalty.

First, the one and one-half times charge is

unreasonably large considering the fact Woodhaven had the
apartment in question on the market for around only fifteen days
before the next tenancy began.

Because Utah is suffering a

severe shortage of available apartments, rerental within such a
short period was to be expected.

Moreover, the Utah Supreme

Court has held that a landlord has a duty to mitigate damages in
the landlord-tenant setting.

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
6

776 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1989).

The Reid court further held that

to not require a landlord to mitigate damages is "analogous to
imposing a disfavored

penalty

upon the tenant."

Id.

Accordingly, allowing Woodhaven to collect such a "re-let" fee
would be allowing it to collect the exact type of penalty
disfavored by the Utah Supreme Court.
More specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a
liquidated damages clause bearing no relation to the actual
damages sustained is unenforceable.

Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah

468, 243 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1952).
Perkins involved a contract for purchase of real estate that
contained a clause for forfeiture of the down payment if the
purchasing party breached the contract.

Perkins held that for a

liquidated damages clause to be enforceable, it must satisfy two
prongs.

First, it must bear "some reasonable relation to the

actual damages which could reasonably be anticipated at the time
the contract was made[.]"

Second, the liquidated damages clause

must not be "a forfeiture which would allow an unconscionable and
exorbitant (sic) recovery."

Perkins, 243 P.2d at 449.

This court should follow the dictates of the Utah Supreme
Court in Perkins and find that Woodhaven's liquidated damages
clause is unenforceable because it fails to meet the standards
set forth in Perkins. Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause
7

bears no reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered,
thus should be considered an "unconscionable and exorbitant
recovery."

Id.

Through the liquidated damages clause, Woodhaven received
double rent payments for the period of November 16 through
November 30, 1991. There can be no doubt that Woodhaven did not
"mitigate damages" in the legal sense because to legally
"mitigate damages" means to help relieve the burden upon the
breaching party.

Woodhaven admits that a new tenant had rented

the premises by November 16, 1991, therefore the $531.00 charged
to Washington becomes nothing more than a penalty disguised as a
termination fee.
B,

Washington Lacked a Meaningful Choice Regarding
Woodhavenys Liquidated Damages Clause.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that unconscionability
includes the absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties together with the contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.
Huth, 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983).

Bekins Bar V Ranch v.

According to the Utah Supreme

Court's interpretation of unconscionability factors, Washington
lacked a meaningful choice when she signed Woodhaven's
residential lease.
Washington signed Woodhaven's lease during a severe housing
shortage.

At present and at the time in question, there was a
8

severe shortage of available apartments in the Salt Lake area.
Washington had no choice regarding what terms would be included
in her leases because of the tight housing market, and the form
contract that was used.

The liquidated damages clause was just

another paragraph of a typical boiler-plate, closely printed
lease agreement that favored the management.

As indicated above,

Woodhaven was quick to point out some paragraphs in the lease but
neglected to point out the penalty clause that instigated this
action.
To claim that Washington had a meaningful choice in signing
a lease that contained a penalty clause during the tight housing
situation is to strip the UCSPA of its intended protections, in
complete disregard for the law. Washington had no meaningful
choice when she affixed her signature on Woodhaven's lease.
The penalty clause contained in the lease should be declared
unconscionable.
C.

Collection of Woodhaven'& Liquidated Damages Clause is a
Deceptive and Unconscionable Act as Contemplated in the
UCSPA,

The Utah Legislature enacted the UCSPA to protect consumers
from deceptive and unconscionable acts.

Woodhaven's liquidated

damages clause falls into the category of deceptive and
unconscionable acts because it is a penalty, not a true
liquidated damages clause.
9

Courts will not enforce penalty clauses, as indicated in
California and Massachusetts Supreme Court rulings.

These courts

have held that an unfair and deceptive practice occurs when
landlords include illegal and unenforceable terms in leases.

See

People v. McKale, 602 P.2d 731 (Cal. 1980) (unfair practice
occurs when tenants could be deceived as to mobile home park
operator's authority to enforce illegal agreement terms); Leardi
v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985).

See also, Commonwealth

v. De Cotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974) (fee for resale of
mobile home deceptive where services not rendered).
Woodhaven's inclusion of liquidated damages clause in its
residential leases renders such practice deceptive and
unconscionable pursuant to the UCSPA.

POINT TWO
THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR A UTAH LANDLORD
IN BREACH OF LEASE SITUATION IS
ITEMIZATION OF CALCULATED DAMAGES
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the methodology for
calculating damages after a breached lease in Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).

Reid held that in a

breached lease situation, the landlord retains the burden of
proving specific damages and that proper mitigation efforts were
taken.

This burden is satisfied only through an active,

affirmative showing on the landlord's side.
10

The Reid court

supported the landlord's right to collect rent until the premises
are rerented, as well as costs of repairs and advertising to find
new tenants.

However, the Reid court held that to collect

monetary damages beyond that stated above, the landlord must
institute supplemental proceedings to prove such damages have
occurred even with reasonable mitigation efforts.
at 906.

Reid, 776 P.2d

The trial court's ruling allowing Woodhaven to collect

under the liquidated damages clause is in direct conflict with
this decision from the Utah Supreme Court.
The trial court improperly applied the law when it granted
complete judgment to Woodhaven.

Woodhaven seeks from Washington

expenses for repairs, full amount of rent from October 31, 1991,
through November 16, 1991, when the premises were rerented, and
$531.00 under the liquidated damages clause.

Reid prevents

Woodhaven from collecting under the liquidated damages clause
unless it can prove specific damages. Woodhaven admits that it
cannot.

[Tr. 43-4]

Because Woodhaven cannot prove specific damages and because
its liquidated damages clause works as a penalty, this court
should rule consistently with the dictates of the Utah Supreme
Court and reverse the trial court's decision.

11

CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the lower court's decision and
rule that Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause is unconscionable
and contrary to Utah law as expressed in Reid,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~7 day of f Lr^^^^1

1994.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES
Attorneys for Appellant
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13-11-3. Definitions.
A3 used m this chapter
(1) 'Charitable solicitation' means any request directly or indirectly for money, credit,
property, financial assistance, or any other thing
of value on the plea or representation that it will
be used for a charitable purpose A charitable
solicitation may be made in any manner, including.
(a) any oral or written request, including
a telephone request,
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting
of any handbill, written advertisement, or
publication,
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or
request of donations for any book, card,
chance, coupon, device, magazine, membership, merchandise, subscription, ticket,
flower, flag, button, sticker, nbbon, token,
trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other
article in connection with which any appeal
is made for any charitable purpose, or where
the name of any charitable organization or
movement is used or referred to as an inducement or reason for making any purchase
donation or where, in connection with any
sale or donation, any statement is made that
the whole or any part of the proceeds of any
sale or donation will go to or be donated to
any charitable purpose A charitable solicitation is considered complete when made,
whether or not the organization or person
making the solicitation receives any contribution or makes any sale
(2) Consumer transaction* means a sale,
lease assignment, award by chance, or other
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods,
services, or other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance) to a
person for primarily personal, family or household purposes or for purposes that relate to a
business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or property and his personal
services on a continuing basis and in which he
has not been Dreviouslv engaged, or a solicitation
or offer bv a suDDher with respect to any of these
transfers or dispositions It includes any offer or
solicitation anv agreement anv oerformance of
an agreement with respect to anv of these transfers or dispositions and an> cnantable solicitation as defined in this section
'3) Enforcing authority' means the Division
of Consumer Protection
<4> Final judgment1 means a judgment, including anv supporting opinion that determines
the rights of the parties and concerning which
appellate remedies have been exhausted or the
time for appeal has expired
5 Person means an individual corporation
government, governmental subdivision or
agencv business trust estate trust partnership
association cooperative or any other legal entitv
(6) 'Supplier* means a seller lessor assignor,
offeror broker or other person who regularly solicits engages in or enforces consumer transactions whether or not he deals directly with the
consumer
1987

13-11-5.

Unconscionable act or practice by supplier.
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier
in connection with a consumer transaction violates
this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its determination.
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is
unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to
know.

1973

ADDENDUM 2-1

70A-2a-504. Liquidation of damages.
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other act or omission, including indemnity for loss or diminution of anticipated tax benefits or
loss or damage to lessor's residual interest, may be liquidated in the lease
agreement, but only at an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light
of the then anticipated harm caused by the default or other act or omission.
(2) If the lease agreement provides for liquidation of damages, and such
provision does not comply with Subsection (1), or such provision is an exclusive or limited remedy that circumstances cause to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this chapter.
(3) If the lessor justifiably withholds or stops delivery of goods because of
the lessee's default or insolvency as provided in Section 70A-2a-525 or
70A-2a-526, the lessee is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the
sum of his payments exceeds:
(a) the amount to which the lessor is entitled by virtue of terms liquidating the lessor's damages in accordance with Subsection (1); or
(b) in the absence of those terms, 20 percent of the then present value
of the total rent the lessee was obligated to pay for the balance of the
lease term, or, in the case of a consumer lease, the lesser of such amount
or $500.
(4) A lessee's right to restitution under Subsection (3) is subject to offset to
he extent the lessor establishes:
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this chapter
other than Subsection (1); and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the lessee directly
or indirectly by reason of the lease contract.
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-504, enacted by
. 1990, ch. 197, § 53.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 197,
§ 82 makes the act effective on July 1, 1990.

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WOODHAVEN APARTMENTS,
-*

DECISION

Plaintiff,
*

vs.
*

Case No. 920005207

BERTHA WASHINGTON
*

Defendant.

it

*

The above-entitled matter is an action for damages resulting from the early termination
of a residential lease. Associated issues raised by the parties included application of a
liquidated damages provision in the lease, application of a consumer protection statutory
scheme to the transaction, and whether the lease was unconscionable.
This matter came to trial on July 15, 1993. Plaintiff was represented by James Deans
and Defendant was represented by Bruce Plenk. Several pretrials conferences were held on
this matter with the attorneys.1 An extended time period was provided for filing of motions
and supporting memoranda to accommodate the change of counsel and juggling of attorney
and court calendars. Prior to the time of trial, the court determined after review of
memoranda from both Plaintiff and Defendant, that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act2
applied to the lease in this case. The court found that Woodhaven Apartments was a
"supplier" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Sec 13-11-3(6). The court also found that the

1

Plaintiff was previously represented by Martin Pezeley, who appeared several times and
filed some of the many motions and briefs in this matter.
2

13-11-1 et seq., U.C.A. (1992).

ADDENDUM 5 - 1

leasing agreement at issue was a "consumer transaction" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Sec.
13-11-3(2).
ISSUES
Plaintiff claimed actual property damages of S705.00 plus a re-let fee of $531.00,
calculated at 1 1/2 months rental rate, per the lease contract. Defendant countered that the
contract was unconscionable, and that the Plaintiff was liable under the UCSPA for the
minimum damages provided in the Act. Defendant also argued that the only monetary
remedy available for a broken lease was a damage finding based upon actual expenses
attributable to the specific broken lease, including rent until the premises were re-let.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A lease was entered into by Defendant on May 30, 1991, for an apartment in the
Woodhaven Apartment complex. Paragraph 26 in the lease agreement, which appeared
immediately above the signature line, provided for an assessment of 1 1/2 months rent for
early termination of the lease when the property is re-let prior to the termination date of the
lease. Defendant and co-tenant paid a deposit of $354.00, $25.00 of which was termed nonrefundable, at the time of moving into the apartment. The term of the lease was to expire on
May 14, 1992. The monthly rental on the apartment unit was to be $354.00 per month.
Defendant vacated the apartment on November 1, 1991. Rent had been paid at the regular
rate through October 15, 1991. The apartment was re-let on November 15, 1991. Plaintiff
claimed property damages of $705.00, but was unable to support the claim with itemized
invoices or receipts. Nor was plaintiff able to show the condition of the premises prior to
defendant occupying the premises.

2
ADDENDUM 5-2

Defendant's co-tenant signed a written agreement entitled "Agreement To Accept
Partial Rent Payment" on October 21. In the agreement Plaintiffs agent agreed to accept
S200 that same day and a balance of $179.00 by the 31st of October. The $200 was paid,
but the balance per the agreement was never paid. Defendant did not sign the agreement,
although the plaintiff believed that the co-tenant was acting on behalf of the Defendant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendant argues that the lease agreement, specifically the provision in Paragraph 26
dealing with an assessment of 1 1/2 months rental for early termination of the lease, is
unconscionable and violates the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA).
The Court hereby finds that the contested provision is not unconscionable. The terms,
while not particularly well drafted, are not deceptive or misleading. It is the last substantive
provision appearing before the signature. There was no apparent attempt to bury the
provision in the body of the lease. While the better practice might have been to place the
liquidated damages provision in bold letters, or require that initials be placed in the margin to
draw attention to the clause, the lack of these steps does not render the provision
unconscionable. There is no complicated formula to be applied. Even a cursory reading
would put a tenant on notice that there is a penalty for early termination of the lease. The
contract is not an adhesion contract, the tenants were not forced to rent from a complex
offering patently offensive terms. In the absence of compelling evidence the court must
assume that other rental properties were available in the Salt Lake housing market at the time
Defendant chose to lease from Plaintiff.

3
ADDENDUM 5 - 3

Plaintiff, whenever there is an early termination of a lease agreement, incurs costs
over and above those normally associated with providing residential housing. Plaintiff
reasonably could anticipate incurring these costs only when the lease terminates at the
expiration of the lease term. Plaintiff is required to clean the premises, perform whatever
minor repairs are necessary to make the unit attractive to a prospective tenant, perform the
necessary administrative details to ensure that the work is properly and timely done, advertise
for the vacancy, have personnel available to show the apartment to prospective tenants,
prepare the necessary paperwork for the prospective tenant, perform various checks of
prospective tenants, etc. All of these duties draw upon the resources of the plaintiff.
Incurring these costs sooner than anticipated when the lease is terminated early results in
added costs and expenses for a landlord.
Plaintiff is then faced with deciding how best to cover the costs associated with early
terminations. Plaintiff might charge higher rental fees for all tenants, to cover the costs of
early terminations.3 Or Plaintiff might keep exacting accounting records of individualized
costs related to each individual rental unit.
For good policy reasons, the law applicable to this case should not be interpreted to
require that a plaintiff increase potential costs by requiring an exacting accounting of time and
effort for each unit, unless there is an express requirement in the controlling statutes or
contract. Plaintiff should be entitled to take reasonable steps to minimize the accounting costs
by spreading duplicative activities over the entire complex operational expenses. Nor should

3

This, however, would result in higher fees being charged to all tenants. It is not
unreasonable for Plaintiff to resist charging all tenants for the costs associated with the actions
of only a few, the early terminations.
4
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the law require that separate incremental advertising costs be incurred for each individual
unit. Paragraph 26, the liquidated damage provision, appears to be a means of minimizing
these costs. In an individual case this may result in a cost savings or increase for an early
terminating tenant.4 This practice does not rise to the level of unconscionable action in this
case.5 The liquidated damages provision at issue is interpreted by this court as a replacement
for the normal costs which otherwise are routine expenses associated with an early lease
termination. Itemized costs would not, therefore, be allowed in addition to liquidated
damages except for unusual or intentionally malicious damages.
The provision is not, as a matter of law, unconscionable. An assessment of 1 1/2
months rental is not out of proportion to the effort and resources that must be expended to rerent the premises. The contract did not grant arbitrary and unfettered rights to the plaintiff,
nor was the contract one that raised the spectre of procedural unconscionability.6 This
liquidated damages provision of the contract does not shock the conscience as being unfair or
oppressive. Additionally, there was no evidence that the supplier was in a position where it
knew or should have known that the contract provision was unconscionable.

4

For example the complex need not run a separate newspaper ad for each vacant apartment,
but may rather run one ad. The resultant cost might result in a per apartment cost that varies
depending upon the number of vacancies at any one time. If there were several apartments
vacant, the cost would be shared among all the vacant apartments, thus a smaller per unit cost.
If there were only one vacant unit, the per unit cost would be higher. The same could be applied
to the salaries of employees to show the apartments and other associated costs.
5

In a one or two unit apartment building the legal conclusion may not necessarily be the

same.
6

Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company. Inc.. 706 P.
2d 1028 (Utah, 1985).
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At the conclusion of the hearing the court was prepared to issue a ruling from the
bench, but was persuaded that the issue of exclusive remedy, as raised in Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah, 1989), should be examined. After review of Reid .
this court is not convinced that the current caselaw in Utah specifies itemized damages as the
exclusive remedy in cases involving breaches of residential leases.
Computation of Damages
The liquidated damages clause in the lease agreement does not violate the provisions
of UCSPA, and will therefore be applied in assessing the damages resulting from the early
termination of the lease agreement. The damages provision in the agreement sets the
measurement of damages at 1 1/2 months rent. The rental rate was SQt by contract at $354,
times 1 1/2 months equals $541.00 in liquidated damages. In addition Defendant is liable for
the one month of rent from the end of her paid up time until the apartment was re-let. The
filing fee of $15.00 together with 59.00 in service of process fees results in $24.00 of court
costs to be added to the judgement damages. Defendant had previously paid $329.00 in
refundable deposits. Defendant should also be given credit for the $200.00 paid by co-tenant
at the time notice of intent to leave was given. Applying the deposit as an offset, leaves a
balance due of $389.00 owed by Defendant to Plaintiff.7

7

$531 liquidated damages
354 rent unpaid Oct 15 to Nov 15
24 court costs
$909 total owed
-$329 refundable deposit
- 200 paid by co-tenant
$389 Judgement
6

Attorney fees for the prevailing party are provided in the rental agreement. The court
finds that the attorney fees in this case should be apportioned. Defendant succeeded in
applying the UCSPA to the contract, over the objection of Plaintiff. Plaintiff succeeded in
resisting a finding of unconscionability and ultimately obtaining judgement for damages.
Plaintiff is therefore awarded attorney fees for work directly related to the breach of the
agreement and resultant damages, but not for work done on the question of UCSPA
application. Defendant is not awarded attorney fees because they did not prevail on the
question of contractual breach nor violation of the UCSPA. This apportionment is done to
more accurately reflect the relative success of the parties in pursuing their claims under the
rental agreement.
Upon submission of an affidavit reflecting attorney fees, judgement will be entered for
$389.00 plus attorney fees, absent an objection by Defendant as to the reasonableness of the
requested fees.
Dated this / ^ day of November, 1993.

/

William'A! Thorne, Jr.
Circuit Court Judge
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